

RECONSTRUCTING INDONESIA'S ANTI-CORRUPTION AUTHORITY THROUGH COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE

Igam Arya Wada*

Faculty of Law, Universitas Jember, Indonesia
igamaryawada@unej.ac.id

M. Ega Andika Pramudita

Faculty of Law, Universitas Jember, Indonesia
elovev60@gmail.com

Muhammad Raihan Fadhil Setyawan

Faculty of Law, Universitas Jember, Indonesia
raihaanfs48@gmail.com

Volume 5, Number 2, September 2026

Received: August 11, 2026 Accepted: August 12, 2026 Online Published: September 22, 2026.

ABSTRACT

Law Number 19 of 2019 places the Corruption Eradication Commission within the executive branch while retaining its coordination and supervision duties under Article 6 letters b and d, operationalized through Articles 8 and 10 and strengthened by the takeover mechanism in Article 10A. The issue examined is not the de jure loss of these functions, but the absence of binding regulation requiring the Police, the Prosecutor's Office, and the Corruption Eradication Commission to determine jurisdictional allocation before suspects are named. This article analyzes how ambiguity in post-amendment investigative authority creates space for institutional ego-centrism and how Collaborative Anti-Corruption Governance may restore institutional coherence. This doctrinal legal research uses statutory, conceptual, and case approaches to primary, secondary, and tertiary legal materials. Two suspect designations by the Attorney General's Office and the National Police in July 2026 are used as real cases and analyzed normatively. The analysis shows that parallel investigative authority under the Criminal Procedure Code, the Corruption Eradication Commission Law, and other sectoral laws is not yet accompanied by rules allocating operational roles consequently, Article 50 of Law Number 30 of 2002 functions merely as a notification obligation. This article proposes a law-based power-sharing mechanism grounded in the Commission's coordination and supervision functions through a mandatory joint case-title forum when corruption involves individuals from two or more law enforcement institutions, supported by decision-making rules, conflict-of-interest mitigation, and a rigid objection mechanism.

Keywords : ego-centric institutions; reciprocal criminalization; collaborative anti-corruption governance; corruption investigation authority; corruption in populist programs.

I. INTRODUCTION

Corruption in Indonesia has long since moved beyond being merely a problem of individual misconduct by officials to a problem of the institutional architecture of the state of law. More than two decades after the reforms, the expectation that the presence of the Corruption Eradication Commission (hereinafter referred to as the KPK) would be the fulcrum of corruption eradication is now confronted with a paradox in which corruption is still classified as an extraordinary crime that harms state finances, public services, and public trust, while the institutions designed to deal with it have themselves undergone a change of position, authority, and basic working patterns.¹ The question that arises is not only how firmly the state takes action, but how the authority to eradicate corruption is organized among law enforcement agencies so that they work coherently rather than in conflict with one another.

This problem is important because corruption not only causes state financial losses, but also produces social injustice when the development budget is misappropriated and citizens' rights to education, health, and basic services are impaired. In his book, Wahyu Beny Mukti emphasizes that the complexity of contemporary corruption demands a combination of firm action, systematic prevention, asset recovery, and what is often overlooked, namely an institutional design that is coherent and free from overlapping authority.² In other words, the quality of corruption eradication is not only determined by the sharpness of criminal norms, but also by the clarity of the governance of authority between law enforcement officials.

The starting point of the problem lies in Law Number 19 of 2019 concerning the Second Amendment to Law Number 30 of 2002 on the Corruption Eradication Commission (hereinafter Law No. 19 of 2019). A provision-by-provision reading is required before any claim of weakening can be sustained. Article 3 places the Commission within the executive cluster while declaring it independent, the status of its employees is converted to state civil apparatus, and a Supervisory Board is created.³ At the same time, Article 6 letters b and d expressly retain the tasks of coordination with, and supervision of, the institutions authorised to eradicate corruption, and those tasks are operationalised through Article 8 and Article 10 respectively, while Article 10A regulates the takeover of investigation and prosecution.⁴ What the

¹ Zainal Arifin Mochtar, "Independensi Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi Pasca Undang-Undang Nomor 19 Tahun 2019," *Jurnal Konstitusi* 18:2 (2021): 321 pada 340–344, DOI: 10.31078/jk1824.

² Wahyu Beny Mukti Setiyawan et al., *Hukum Pidana Korupsi* (Serang: Sada Kurnia Pustaka, 2024), pada 47–58; Kamri Ahmad, *Upaya Pemberantasan Korupsi*, ed ke-2 (Makassar: Nas Media Pustaka, 2022).

³ Wahib, "Memaknai Independensi KPK Pasca Perubahan Kedua Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 19 Tahun 2019 atas Undang-Undang Nomor 30 Tahun 2002 tentang Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi," *Rechtsregel: Jurnal Ilmu Hukum* 5:1 (2022), DOI: 10.32493/rjih.v5i1.23776; Lihat juga Fery Andriansyah & Anom Wahyu Asmorojati, "The Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) in the Dynamics of Constitutional Legal Politics Following Law No. 19 of 2019," *Lex Renaissance* 10:1 (2025): 249 pada 255–265, DOI: 10.20885/JLR.vol10.iss1.art10.

⁴ Undang-Undang Nomor 19 Tahun 2019 tentang Perubahan Kedua atas Undang-Undang Nomor 30 Tahun 2002 tentang Komisi Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi, Pasal 3, Pasal 6 huruf b dan huruf d, Pasal 8, Pasal 10, dan Pasal 10A, online:

amendment altered, therefore, is not the existence of the coordination and supervision authority *de jure*, but the institutional position from which that authority is exercised and the conditions under which it may be triggered. The distinction matters, because a shift into the executive cluster does not by itself prove a reduction in those functions. The problem examined in this article is accordingly narrower and more precise, namely that parallel investigative authority is not accompanied by an operative rule determining which institution proceeds when jurisdictions intersect, so that the relationship between institutions may drift from a division of authority into a competition over authority.

Within this institutional context, the central issue is not a complete halt in law enforcement, but the weakening of coherence in the allocation and exercise of investigative authority. The legal mechanisms continue to operate, yet their effectiveness depends on whether the Police, the Prosecutor's Office, and the KPK are able to act through a coordinated architecture rather than through overlapping claims of jurisdiction. The available data record 791 corruption cases in 2023 with 1,695 suspects and potential state losses of around IDR 28.4 trillion, while the KPK's performance evaluation for the 2019-2024 period highlights the decline in the quantity and quality of enforcement accompanied by deteriorating internal governance. In addition, Transparency International recorded a decline in Indonesia's Corruption Perceptions Index in 2025 to a score of 34, placing the country 109th out of 180. These figures, which remain high alongside the weakening of institutions, indicate that the problem does not stop at the norms, but spreads to the authority architecture that is no longer coordinated.

This conceptual gap produces an ambiguity that the authors term institutional ego-centrism, namely the tendency of each institution to assert its own legitimacy to the point of prosecuting officials of another institution. Two events in mid-2026 illustrate the pattern. On 2 July 2026 the Attorney General's Office designated an active Brigadier General of Police, Lalu Muhammad Iwan Mahardan, then serving as Deputy Secretary at the National Nutrition Agency, as a suspect in the procurement of food trays under the Free Nutritious Meal programme.⁵ Nine days later, on 11 July 2026, the National Police Criminal Investigation Agency designated the former Deputy Attorney General for Special Crimes, Febrie Adriansyah, as a suspect in alleged corruption and money laundering.⁶ Two near-contemporaneous

<<https://peraturan.bpk.go.id/Home/Details/122028/uu-no-19-tahun-2019>>, diakses 20 Agustus 2026.

⁵ "Brigjen Polisi Aktif Jadi Tersangka Korupsi MBG, Polri: Tidak Ada Impunitas" (2 Juli 2026), online: Kompas <<https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2026/07/02/15325581/brigjen-polisi-aktif-jadi-tersangka-korupsi-mbg-polri-tidak-ada-impunitas>>; "Kejagung Tetapkan Polisi Tersangka Korupsi MBG, Ini Tanggapan Polri" (3 Juli 2026), online: CNBC Indonesia <<https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20260703110943-4-747778/kejagung-tetapkan-polisi-tersangka-korupsi-mbg-ini-tanggapan-polri>>. Tersangka adalah Brigjen Pol Lalu Muhammad Iwan Mahardan, Sekretaris Deputi pada Badan Gizi Nasional.

⁶ Pusat Studi Hukum dan Kebijakan Indonesia & Indonesia Corruption Watch, Laporan Evaluasi Kinerja Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi Periode 2019–2024 (Jakarta: PSHK dan ICW, 2024) pada 45–56, online: <<https://pshk.or.id/publikasi/riset/laporan-evaluasi-kinerja-komisi-pemberantasan-korupsi-periode-2019-2024/>>.

designations do not, by themselves, establish reciprocal criminalisation. They may equally reflect the lawful accountability of individual officials, which is precisely what both institutions asserted at the time. The authors therefore treat the pattern as an indication requiring further testing against objective indicators, namely the chronology of case registration, the intersection of the objects of the two cases, the presence or absence of prior coordination under Article 50 of Law Number 30 of 2002, and the institutional affiliation of the officials concerned. Read against those indicators, the two events are used in this article as illustrations of a structural risk created by unallocated parallel authority, not as evidence of retaliatory intent.

In the ideal law enforcement design, the relationship between the KPK, the Prosecutor's Office, and the Police should be placed in the framework of coordination, supervision, and differentiation of functions, rather than in the logic of a race to handle cases.⁷ When the logic of competition is more prominent than synergy, is prone to turning into a stage for legitimacy claims, and the institutional energy that should be directed to corrupt actors is absorbed into friction between the apparatus. Therefore, the pattern of mutual targeting should not be read merely as an issue of individual ethics, but as a structural consequence of the duplication of authority norms and the loss of the controlling function that was previously attached to the KPK.

The complexity increases because the arena of corruption is now encroaching on the populist programs of the state which are actually framed with a narrative of efficiency and welfare for the people even though in practice they do not meet expectations. The food-tray procurement case in the Free Nutritious Meal program shows how the government's flagship program can be transformed into a new corruption channel, while the Red and White Village Cooperative program with its large budget and underdeveloped oversight is considered to be at high risk of becoming a field of structured corruption.⁸ Both patterns could in fact have been anticipated, yet the analyses produced by various institutions have never been heeded by the government, as though it had turned a blind eye, the state occupies a paradoxical position as both an actor and a victim of corruption. The state channels substantial funds through populist programs, but at the same time the funds are targeted by the apparatus and the surrounding networks.

This series of circumstances leads to the erosion of public trust. Anti-corruption institutions work not only through formal authority, but also through social legitimacy. When the public repeatedly witnesses the officials mandated to eradicate corruption naming one another as suspects or being implicated in cases themselves, moral support for the anti-corruption agenda

⁷ Fauzul Masyhudi, "Sinergisitas Peran Aparat Penegak Hukum Dalam Penangan Korupsi di Indonesia" (2023) 13:1 *Madania: Jurnal Hukum Pidana dan Ketatanegaraan Islam* 1 pada 7–9, online: <<https://journals.fasya.uinib.org/index.php/madania/article/view/500>>.

⁸ "Koperasi Merah Putih Berisiko Tinggi Jadi Ladang Korupsi Baru" (2026), online: *The Conversation* <<https://theconversation.com/koperasi-merah-putih-berisiko-tinggi-jadi-ladang-korupsi-baru-261401>>; "KPK Ingatkan Potensi Korupsi di Koperasi Desa Merah Putih, Dorong Transparansi sejak Awal" (2026), online: *InfoPublik* <<https://infopublik.id/kategori/prioritas-nasional/920780/kpk-ingatkan-potensi-korupsi-di-koperasi-desa-merah-putih-dorong-transparansi-sejak-awal>>.

also declines.⁹ Opinion surveys even show that trust in law enforcement agencies is volatile and easily eroded by institutional controversies. The apathy that arises is not born from the public's ignorance of the dangers of corruption, but from the experience of witnessing the eradication of corruption turn into a power contest between institutions.

Facing this impasse, this paper offers the idea of *Collaborative Anti-Corruption Governance* as a framework for reorganizing authority between institutions based on coordination and public legitimacy. This idea is based on the theory of *collaborative governance* which emphasizes cross-institutional involvement in a consensus-oriented decision-making process to replace adversarial relationship patterns.¹⁰ Placed in the context of eradicating corruption, the framework is directed at breaking the chain of state capture on populist programs, restore the coherence of the institutional architecture, while rebuilding public legitimacy that has been eroded by sectoral egos.

Previous studies on the position of the Commission after the amendment fall into three strands. The first examines the decline of institutional independence, measured against the shift into the executive cluster and the creation of the Supervisory Board.¹¹ The second maps the normative overlap of investigative authority between the Police, the Prosecutor's Office, and the Commission without proposing a rule that allocates a case when two claims meet.¹² The third applies collaborative governance to the prevention of corruption, and therefore operates upstream of enforcement. None of the three connects the allocation of investigative jurisdiction with a collaborative design that reaches the enforcement stage itself. This article occupies that space by treating the 2026 designations as illustrations of unallocated parallel authority, by linking that condition to the supervision of large-scale populist programmes, and by proposing Collaborative Anti-Corruption Governance as a reconstruction of the enforcement architecture rather than as a preventive instrument alone.

On the basis of the foregoing, this article addresses two research questions. First, how does the configuration of investigative authority after Law Number 19 of 2019 create the conditions in which institutional ego-centrism can emerge between the Police and the Prosecutor's Office? Second, how can Collaborative Anti-Corruption Governance be designed, within the

⁹ Indikator Politik Indonesia, Tingkat Kepercayaan Publik terhadap Lembaga Penegak Hukum dan Politik: Temuan Survei Nasional 30 Desember 2023–6 Januari 2024 (Jakarta: Indikator Politik Indonesia, 2024); "Tingkat Kepercayaan Publik terhadap Lembaga Hukum, Kejaksaan Tertinggi" (23 Januari 2024), online: Hukumonline <<https://www.hukumonline.com/berita/a/tingkat-kepercayaan-publik-terhadap-lembaga-hukum--kejakung-tertinggi-lt65afca1bbb519>>.

¹⁰ Chris Ansell & Alison Gash, "Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 18:4 (2008): 543 pada 543–549, DOI: 10.1093/jopart/mum032.

¹¹ Novi Enjelina Putri & Muhaimin, "Dekonstruksi Independensi KPK Pasca-Revisi UU No. 19 Tahun 2019: Analisis Politik Hukum dan Penanganan Korupsi Pejabat Eksekutif," *Jurnal Politik Pemerintahan Dharma Praja* 18:2 (2025), DOI: 10.33701/jppdp.v18i2.5708.

¹² Petir Dahsyat Hadi Prakoesa, Dwi Wachidiyah Ningsih & Suyanto, "Tumpang Tindih Kewenangan Penyidikan Korupsi: Dampak terhadap Kepastian Hukum dan Due Process of Law," *Judge: Jurnal Hukum* 6:07 (2026): 1302 pada 1305–1308, DOI: 10.54209/judge.v6i07.1997.

existing constitutional and statutory framework, to restore the institutional architecture of corruption eradication? Two objectives follow. The first is to map the allocation of investigative authority across the Criminal Procedure Code and the sectoral laws and to identify the precise point at which allocation is left unregulated. The second is to formulate an allocation mechanism that is operative, legally grounded, and compatible with the independence of each institution.

Several terms used in this article carry evaluative weight and are therefore defined operationally before the analysis proceeds. Impasse denotes a condition in which enforcement mechanisms continue to operate but lose institutional momentum and consistency because no rule determines which institution acts. Institutional ego-centrism denotes the tendency of an institution to prioritise the maintenance of its own jurisdiction and legitimacy over the collective objective of enforcement, indicated by competing claims over the same case object. Reciprocal criminalisation denotes the initiation of criminal proceedings by one enforcement institution against officials of another in matters connected with the authority to eradicate corruption. State capture denotes the systematic influencing of the formation or implementation of public policy by private interests for private gain. A populist programme denotes a government programme with a large budget, a broad beneficiary base, and direct political salience. These terms are used descriptively as analytical categories and not as political labels.

II. RESEARCH METHOD

This study applies doctrinal legal research using three approaches. The statute approach examines Law Number 19 of 2019 together with Law Number 30 of 2002, Law Number 20 of 2025 on the Criminal Procedure Code, Law Number 31 of 1999 as amended by Law Number 20 of 2001 on the Eradication of Corruption, Law Number 2 of 2002 on the Indonesian National Police, Law Number 16 of 2004 as amended by Law Number 11 of 2021 on the Prosecutor's Office, and Presidential Regulation Number 102 of 2020 on the Implementation of Supervision of Corruption Eradication. The conceptual approach draws on the literature of bureaucratic politics, turf war, legitimacy contest, and collaborative governance to construct the concept of institutional ego-centrism. The case approach examines documentary material relating to the two designations of July 2026, namely the official releases of the Attorney General's Office and the National Police, together with Constitutional Court Decision Number 87/PUU-XXI/2023. Legal materials are ordered hierarchically. Primary materials comprise statutes, implementing regulations, and judicial decisions. Secondary materials comprise peer-reviewed journal articles, monographs, and institutional reports. Tertiary materials comprise legal dictionaries and encyclopaedias. Materials are selected on three criteria, namely direct relevance to the allocation of investigative authority, currency, and verifiability against official sources. Media reports are used only to corroborate chronology and are not relied upon to establish propositions of law or institutional causation. Interpretation proceeds grammatically, systematically, historically, and purposively, followed by legal harmonisation between the general and the special regimes and by prescriptive reasoning.

Because the design is normative, the study does not claim to establish causation empirically. The two events of July 2026 are treated as cases method within normative analysis, and the limits of causal inference from documentary material are acknowledged throughout.

III. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

A. Institutional Ego-Centric Between the Police and the Prosecutor's Office in the Investigation of Corruption Crimes

The problem of overlapping investigative authority basically cannot be separated from how the criminal procedure law constructs the division of authority between law enforcement agencies. Clarity in the normative design concerning the institutions vested with investigative authority is the main prerequisite for realizing an integrated criminal justice system, because it determines the effectiveness of coordination between law enforcement, prevents conflicts of authority, and ensures legal certainty in the criminal law enforcement process.¹³ Therefore, the discussion of the authority of investigation needs to begin by examining the provisions contained the Criminal Procedure Code (hereinafter referred to as the KUHAP) as the *lex generalis* that provides the basis for the implementation of the investigative function in Indonesia.¹⁴

Article 6 of Law Number 20 of 2025 concerning the Criminal Procedure Code (KUHAP) stipulates that investigators consist of Investigators of the National Police of the Republic of Indonesia (Polri), Civil Servant Investigators (PPNS), and certain investigators vested with authority by law. This provision shows that the National Police is still placed as the primary investigator in the Indonesian criminal justice system which has the general authority to conduct investigations into all criminal acts. Meanwhile, PPNS and certain investigators only exercise limited investigative authority in accordance with the scope of authority expressly provided by the sectoral law under which they were established.

The affirmation of the position of the National Police as the main investigator is increasingly seen in the provisions of Article 7 paragraph (4) of the KUHAP (Criminal Procedure Code) which requires PPNS and certain investigators to coordinate with the main investigator, namely the National Police, from the start of the investigation process until the case file is handed over to the public prosecutor. This provision is intended to maintain uniformity of investigation mechanisms, avoid overlapping authority, and realize integration in the criminal justice system. However, the obligation of coordination does not apply to investigators from the Prosecutor's Office of the Republic of Indonesia, the KPK, and the Indonesian Navy (TNI AL), as affirmed in Article 7 paragraph (5) of the KUHAP. This exception shows that the three

¹³ Zulhadi Savitri Noor, "Penguatan Koordinasi Penyidikan Tindak Pidana Korupsi Antar Lembaga Penegak Hukum Dalam Sistem Peradilan Pidana," *Syar Hukum: Jurnal Ilmu Hukum* 19:2 (2021): 213 pada 220–224, DOI: 10.29313/shjih.v19i2.8889.

¹⁴ Badan Pembinaan Hukum Nasional, Politik Hukum Penyelidikan dan Penyidikan dalam Hukum Acara Pidana (Jakarta: BPHN, Kementerian Hukum dan HAM RI) pada 33, online:<https://bphn.go.id/data/documents/ae_hukum_acara_pidana_penyelidikan_dan_penyidikan.pdf>.

institutions are given independent investigative authority based on special provisions in their respective laws.

Consequently, the institutional design constructed under the KUHAP places the National Police as the main investigator in the criminal justice system, but at the same time still recognizes the existence of several institutions that have independent investigative authority. Such a regulatory model reflects the differentiation of investigative authority based on the characteristics of criminal acts and the needs of law enforcement. On the other hand, the existence of several institutions that all hold investigative authority without an effective coordination mechanism has the potential to cause overlapping authority which can ultimately trigger institutional contestation in handling certain cases, especially corruption crimes.

In addition to the provisions of the KUHAP, the division of authority for the investigation of corruption crimes is also specifically regulated in Law Number 30 of 2002 concerning the Corruption Eradication Commission (hereinafter referred to as Law No. 30 of 2002) as *lex specialis*. The KPK was not initially intended to take over the entire investigative function held by the Police or the Prosecutor's Office, but to strengthen the effectiveness of the corruption eradication system through a mechanism of coordination, supervision, and enforcement of certain cases that meet the criteria as determined by law.¹⁵ Therefore, the institutional design built in the KPK Law actually does not place the KPK as an institution that stands alone outside the criminal justice system, but as a trigger mechanism that functions to ensure that all law enforcement officials work synergistically in handling corruption crimes.¹⁶

This conception is reflected in Article 6 letters b and d of Law Number 30 of 2002, which assign to the Commission the tasks of coordinating with the institutions authorised to eradicate corruption and of supervising them. A distinction in numbering must be observed at this point. Under the original Law Number 30 of 2002, the powers attached to coordination were set out in Article 7 and those attached to supervision in Article 8. After the amendment introduced by Law Number 19 of 2019, the powers of coordination appear in Article 8, the powers of monitoring in Article 9, the powers of supervision in Article 10, and the takeover of investigation and prosecution in Article 10A, while Article 7 in its present form concerns the powers attached to prevention.¹⁷ The tasks themselves survived the amendment. What changed was their numbering, the conditions under which they operate, and the institutional position from which they are exercised.

Thus, the initial design of the corruption eradication system in Indonesia was built on the principle of functional differentiation within the framework of the integrated criminal justice system, namely the Police as the main

¹⁵ Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia, Naskah Akademik Rancangan Undang-Undang tentang Perubahan Kedua atas Undang-Undang Nomor 30 Tahun 2002 tentang Komisi Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi (Jakarta: DPR RI, 2019) pada 18–25.

¹⁶ Zainal Arifin Mochtar, "Independensi Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi Pasca Undang-Undang Nomor 19 Tahun 2019" (2021) 18:2 Jurnal Konstitusi 321 pada 323, DOI: 10.31078/jk1824.

¹⁷ Bandingkan penomoran asli dalam Undang-Undang Nomor 30 Tahun 2002, Pasal 6, Pasal 7, dan Pasal 8, dengan penomoran setelah perubahan dalam Undang-Undang Nomor 19 Tahun 2019, Pasal 6, Pasal 7, Pasal 8, Pasal 9, Pasal 10, dan Pasal 10A.

investigator, the Prosecutor's Office as the public prosecutor which, under certain conditions, is also vested with investigative authority, and the KPK as an independent institution that carries out the functions of coordination, supervision, and takes over the handling of certain corruption cases if other law enforcement officials do not carry out their duties effectively.¹⁸ Through this construction, the relationship between law enforcement agencies is essentially designed to complement each other (complementary relationship), not compete with each other in exercising investigative authority.

Although the normative construction was initially designed to realize a synergistic relationship between law enforcement through the coordination and supervision mechanism of the KPK, the institutional configuration underwent fundamental changes following the enactment of Law No. 19 of 2019. These changes did not only touch the institutional aspects of the KPK but also shifted the paradigm of corruption eradication from a coordinating model to a more partial and sectoral model, thus affecting the relationship of authority between law enforcement agencies.¹⁹

One of the most fundamental changes can be seen in the provisions of Article 3 of Law No. 19 of 2019 which places the KPK as a state institution in the executive power cluster, even though it is still declared independent in carrying out its duties and authority. The change in institutional status was then followed by the conversion of KPK employees into State Civil Apparatus (ASN) and the formation of a Supervisory Board which was given the authority to supervise the implementation of KPK duties. These changes have given rise to academic debate about the degree of independence of the KPK, considering that institutional independence is the main prerequisite for the effectiveness of anti-corruption institutions in carrying out enforcement functions independently from the influence of political power and other institutional interests.

Not only in the institutional aspect, the revision of the KPK Law also brings changes to the design of the authority relationship between law enforcement agencies. If previously the KPK was positioned as a trigger mechanism that carried out the function of actively coordinating and supervising the Police and the Prosecutor's Office, after the enactment of Law No. 19 of 2019 this function was narrowed so that it leaving the KPK without a central position in controlling the direction of handling corruption cases. As a result, the coordination mechanism that was previously an instrument to prevent overlapping authority is increasingly losing its effectiveness, thereby opening wider space for overlapping authority between the Police and the Prosecutor's Office in handling corruption crimes.²⁰

Furthermore, the changes brought by Law No. 19 of 2019 not only have an impact on the institutional independence of the KPK, but also change the

¹⁸ Djoko Sumaryanto, Panji Susilo & Budiono, Textbook of Criminal Justice System Course (Surabaya: UBHARA Press, 2024) at 8, online: <<http://eprints.ubhara.ac.id/2721/3/BUKU%20AJAR%20SPP.pdf>>.

¹⁹ Mochtar, *supra* note 17 pada 340–341.

²⁰ Hilmi Mahendra & Pramukhtiko Kencono, "Pengambilalihan Penyidikan Tindak Pidana Korupsi Berdasarkan Undang-Undang Nomor 19 Tahun 2019 tentang Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (Studi Kasus Tindak Pidana Korupsi oleh Lembaga Pembiayaan Ekspor Impor)" (2025) 3:1 Indonesian Journal of Law and Justice 15 pada 7–9, DOI: 10.47134/ijlj.v3i1.4814.

configuration of the authority relationship between law enforcement officials in handling corruption crimes. Normatively, the authority to investigate corruption crimes has never been monopolized by a single institution, but is carried out in parallel by the Police, the Prosecutor's Office, and the KPK based on the provisions of the KUHAP, Law No. 30 of 2002, and Law No. 19 of 2019. However, before the amendment of the KPK Law, the potential for this friction of authority was mitigated through the coordination and supervision function of the KPK which placed the institution as a coordinating authority in the corruption eradication system.

After the enactment of Law No. 19 of 2019, the balance began to shift. Although the coordination and supervision functions are still maintained normatively, the new institutional design no longer places the KPK in an effective position to harmonize the exercise of investigative authority between the Police and the Prosecutor's Office. As a result, parallel investigative authority has increasingly opened space for competing claims of authority by each institution, especially in corruption cases that have strategic value and high public attention.²¹

This shift is even more apparent when linked to the provisions of Article 10A of Law No. 19 of 2019 which grants the KPK the authority to take over the investigation and prosecution of corruption cases that are being handled by the Police or the Prosecutor's Office under certain conditions. On the one hand this provision is intended as a corrective instrument if the handling of cases does not run effectively. However, on the other hand, the existence of the takeover mechanism actually shows that the lawmakers recognize the possibility of more than one institution exercising the authority to investigate the same object of the case. In fact, the criminal procedure law system built through the Criminal Procedure does not, in principle, recognize any mechanism for transferring cases between investigators as a consequence of a conflict of authority, but requires a clear division of functions within the framework of an integrated criminal justice system.

Before any conclusion is drawn about a normative vacuum or a duplication of authority, the full legal basis of investigative authority in corruption cases must be mapped. That basis is distributed across Law Number 31 of 1999 as amended by Law Number 20 of 2001, which defines the offences Law Number 2 of 2002, which grants the National Police general investigative authority Law Number 16 of 2004 as amended by Law Number 11 of 2021, which grants the Prosecutor's Office investigative authority over specified offences including corruption Law Number 30 of 2002 as amended by Law Number 19 of 2019, which grants the Commission investigative authority alongside the tasks of coordination and supervision and Law Number 20 of 2025, which places the National Police as the principal investigator while exempting the Prosecutor's Office, the Commission, and the Navy from the duty to coordinate with it.²² Presidential Regulation Number

²¹ Ratman Desianto, "Sengketa Kewenangan Penyidikan Dalam Rangka Pemberantasan Korupsi" *Kertha Wicaksana* 16:2 (2022): 123 pada 135–138, DOI: 10.22225/kw.16.2.2022.123-139.

²² Undang-Undang Nomor 31 Tahun 1999 tentang Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi sebagaimana diubah dengan Undang-Undang Nomor 20 Tahun 2001; Undang-Undang Nomor 2 Tahun 2002 tentang Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia, Pasal 14 ayat

102 of 2020, issued under Article 10 paragraph (2) of Law Number 19 of 2019, further operationalises supervision in three forms, namely monitoring, examination, and review.²³ Read together, these instruments do not disclose a vacuum of norms. What they disclose is a vacuum of allocation, because none of them determines which institution proceeds when two of them lawfully claim the same case object.

The implications of such configurations are beginning to be seen in practice. One example is the handling of cases of alleged corruption crimes involving the former Deputy Attorney General for Special Crimes (Jampidsus), which was initially handled by the Indonesian National Police, but was subsequently transferred to the Attorney General's Office without going through the takeover mechanism by the KPK as provided for in the KPK Law. This phenomenon shows that the relationship of authority between law enforcement is no longer based on an integrated coordination pattern, but rather resembles jurisdictional contestation which has the potential to cause legal uncertainty, duplication of investigations, and even the mutual defense of authority among institutions.²⁴

Further consequences of this overlapping authority no longer stop at the issue of administrative coordination, but develop into institutional conflicts of a structural nature. This conflict is reflected in the emergence of the phenomenon of reciprocal criminalization, which is a situation in which law enforcement agencies institute legal proceedings against law enforcement officials from other institutions in cases related to the authority to eradicate corruption. Such a phenomenon cannot be understood solely as a personal conflict between law enforcement officials, but must be understood as a manifestation of the failure of institutional design in managing the division of investigative authority.²⁵

The relationship between the amendment and the two designations of July 2026 should not be compressed into a single causal claim. Four explanations are analytically distinct and are treated separately in this article. The first is statutory overlap, that is, the coexistence of several lawful bases of investigative authority over the same offence. The second is implementation failure, that is, the non-use of coordination instruments that already exist, including the notification duty under Article 50 and the supervision mechanism under Presidential Regulation Number 102 of 2020. The third is institutional rivalry, that is, the pursuit of legitimacy by one institution at the

(1) huruf g; Undang-Undang Nomor 16 Tahun 2004 tentang Kejaksaan Republik Indonesia sebagaimana diubah dengan Undang-Undang Nomor 11 Tahun 2021, Pasal 30 ayat (1) huruf d; Undang-Undang Nomor 20 Tahun 2025 tentang Hukum Acara Pidana, Pasal 6 dan Pasal 7 ayat (3) sampai dengan ayat (5).

²³ Peraturan Presiden Nomor 102 Tahun 2020 tentang Pelaksanaan Supervisi Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi, ditetapkan 20 Oktober 2020 berdasarkan delegasi Pasal 10 ayat (2) Undang-Undang Nomor 19 Tahun 2019, online: <<https://peraturan.bpk.go.id/Details/149688/perpres-no-102-tahun-2020>>, diakses 20 Agustus 2026.

²⁴ Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Nomor 87/PUU-XXI/2023; Indonesia Corruption Watch, Laporan Tren Penindakan Korupsi 2024 (Jakarta: ICW, 2025).

²⁵ "Rivalitas Penegak Hukum: Bongkar Borok Baik, Kompromi Buruk" (Juli 2026), online: Tirto.id <<https://tirto.id/rivalitas-penegak-hukum-bongkar-borok-baik-kompromi-buruk-hzBN>>.

expense of another. The fourth is individual misconduct, that is, the criminal responsibility of particular officials, which is established through ordinary criminal process and carries no institutional implication in itself.²⁶ This article argues that the first two are the conditions that make the third possible, and it does not assert that the fourth is reducible to any of them.

Figure 1: authors' construction based on Law Number 20 of 2025, Law Number 30 of 2002, and Law Number 19 of 2019. The figure illustrates the relationship between competing bases of investigative authority and is not offered as evidence of institutional conduct. Every element shown is defined in the accompanying text.



In this study, the condition is constructed as institutional ego-centrism, that is, a situation in which each law enforcement institution prioritizes the interests of maintaining its institutional authority, legitimacy, and jurisdiction rather than the collective goal of eradicating corruption. This concept is a synthesis of the theories of bureaucratic politics, turf war, legitimacy contest, and sectoral egoism, which together explain that public organizations tend to maintain their areas of authority (institutional jurisdiction) while building legitimacy through mastery of the state's strategic functions.²⁷

Theoretically, the principle of functional differentiation in the criminal justice system requires a clear division of roles among law enforcement officials so that each institution performs complementary rather than substitutive or competing functions. However, after the enactment of Law No. 19 of 2019, the configuration has shifted. The Police, the Prosecutor's Office,

²⁶ Dominikus Jawa, Parningotan Malau & Ciptono, "Tantangan Dalam Penegakan Hukum Tindak Pidana Korupsi Di Indonesia," *Jurnal USM Law Review* 7:2 (2024): 1006 pada 1010–1013, DOI: 10.26623/julr.v7i2.9507.


²⁷ Graham Allison & Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, ed ke-2 (New York: Routledge, 2021), pada 255–300; Tom Christensen et al., *Organization Theory and the Public Sector: Instrument, Culture and Myth*, ed ke-3 (London: Routledge, 2022), pada 121–148.

and the KPK all hold the authority to investigate corruption crimes without being accompanied by a coordination mechanism capable of eliminating potential jurisdictional conflicts. As a result, the space of authority that was originally integrated was transformed into an arena of contestation between law enforcement institutions.

The proceedings in Constitutional Court Decision Number 87/PUU-XXI/2023 are frequently invoked in this debate and require careful handling. The case concerned the review of Article 26 paragraph (4) and Article 42 of Law Number 30 of 2002 together with the connectivity provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code and the Law on Military Justice, and the Court affirmed that the Commission is authorised to handle corruption cases involving civil–military connectivity through to a final and binding decision. That holding constitutes the Court’s *ratio decidendi*. An expert statement delivered during the hearing carries no such authority. The observation made there, namely that sectoral ego may obscure the control function of the criminal justice system when inter-agency supervision does not operate effectively, is cited in this article as a doctrinal opinion expressed in a judicial forum and not as judicial confirmation of rivalry between the Police and the Prosecutor’s Office.

This perspective is in line with the theory of bureaucratic politics put forward by Graham Allison, which holds that every government organization tends to make decisions based on its institutional interests (where you stand depends on where you sit). On the other hand, the turf war theory explains the tendency of organizations to defend their areas of authority against the intervention of other institutions, while the concept of legitimacy contest shows that competition between institutions is also directed at gaining public trust and political recognition as the main actor in the eradication of corruption. The combination of these three conditions ultimately gives rise to institutional ego-centrism. It is in this context that the phenomenon of naming one another’s officials as suspects, reporting one another to law enforcement, and competing over the handling of corruption cases must be understood as a logical consequence of a dysfunctional institutional design, not as a stand-alone event.

Figure 1: Authors' construction, synthesising the theories of bureaucratic politics, turf war, and legitimacy contest with the statutory mapping set out above. Each element of the figure is defined in the accompanying text and the figure is not treated as proof of the argument



The institutional ego-centric construction proposed in this study is not only built through normative and theoretical analysis, but also illustrated by law enforcement practice after the enactment of Law No. 19 of 2019. This research proceeds from the argument that the conflict between the Police and the Prosecutor's Office in handling corruption crimes is not a personal or incidental conflict, but a structural consequence of overlapping authority that is not matched by an effective institutional coordination mechanism. The argument gains its relevance from the dynamics of handling cases involving the former Deputy Attorney General for Special Crimes, Febrie Adriansyah, and the former Head of the Special Task Force of the National Police, Lalu Muhammad Iwan Mahardan, who also served as Deputy Secretary of the National Nutrition Agency. The phenomenon of mutual legal proceedings against officials from other institutions shows that relations between law enforcement agencies have shifted from collaboration to jurisdictional contestation, thereby revealing the symptoms of reciprocal criminalization as a manifestation of structural institutional conflicts, not solely individual problems.²⁸

Based on the normative and theoretical analysis above, illustrated by two documented events, this discussion concludes the emergence of institutional ego-centrism in handling corruption crimes is a direct consequence of changes in the design of authority after the enactment of Law No. 19 of 2019. The amendment did not remove the investigative authority of each institution but created an institutional configuration that blurs the boundaries of jurisdiction, weakens the effectiveness of the coordination and supervision

²⁸ Allison & Zelikow, *supra* note 24 pada 255–300; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *Public Integrity Outlook 2024* (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2024), pada 78–85.

functions of the KPK, and allows the investigative authority of the Police, the Prosecutor's Office, and the KPK to run in parallel without adequate control mechanisms. As a result, the principle of functional differentiation in the integrated criminal justice system has shifted into an arena of authority contestation that encourages each institution to maintain its own authority, legitimacy, and institutional interests.

The phenomenon of assigning each other suspects, fighting over case handling, and open conflicts between law enforcement agencies can no longer be understood as personal or incidental dynamics, but as a manifestation of structural flaws in the corruption eradication architecture. Therefore, the fundamental problem that must be addressed is not only the behavior of law enforcement officials, but the reconstruction of the inter-agency authority system through the Collaborative Anti-Corruption Governance model, which is capable of restoring legal certainty, clarifying the division of jurisdiction, strengthening coordination, and rebuilding public legitimacy in Indonesia's corruption eradication system.

B. The Concept of Collaborative Anti-Corruption Governance to Restore the Institutional Architecture of Corruption Eradication in Indonesia

As described in the formulation of the first problem, the institutional ego-centrism that colors the relationship between the Police, the Prosecutor's Office, and the KPK in handling corruption crimes is not a stand-alone problem but a structural consequence of the weakening of the KPK's coordination and supervision function after the revision effected by Law No. 19 of 2019. When the controlling function loses its grip, the vacuum is not left empty but is filled by each institution's logic of self-preservation, a pattern that is theoretically predictable and is illustrated by the two documented events examined in this article as a source of friction between law enforcement institutions in Indonesia.

The question that follows is a narrow one. If the duplication of authority under Articles 6 and 7 of the Criminal Procedure Code and Articles 6, 8, 10, and 10A of Law Number 19 of 2019 is the condition identified in the first research question, what form of governance can address it without resorting to a piecemeal solution that simply enlarges the authority of one institution? This article proceeds from the premise that the answer lies not in the addition of authority, but in the reconstruction of relations between institutions through the framework of collaborative governance, an approach that places actors holding overlapping authority as participants in a consensus-oriented decision-making process rather than as competitors.

The collaborative governance framework developed by Ansell and Gash has been widely adapted in the study of public policy in Indonesia, including in the realm of corruption eradication, with the core idea that the success of collaboration is determined by four interrelated variables, namely initial conditions, institutional design, state leadership, and the collaboration process itself.²⁹ The initial conditions determine the level of trust and conflict that will become capital or even a burden during the collaboration process

²⁹ Anis Wijayanti & Azhar Kasim, "Implementasi Strategi Nasional Pencegahan Korupsi di Indonesia: Perspektif Collaborative Governance," *Integritas: Jurnal Antikorupsi* 7:2 (2022): 291 pada 291–310, DOI: 10.32697/integritas.v7i2.858.

institutional design establishes the basic rules of the game on which the collaboration is based, state leadership functions to keep the process from being dominated by actors with greater power, while the collaboration process requires dialogue to build trust that develops gradually. The study on the application of the stakeholder approach to corruption eradication in the eradication of corruption in Indonesia also confirms that the involvement of multiple actors, including the government, academics, and civil society, has not been optimal because collaboration between stakeholders basically demands clarity of roles that has not been fully articulated to date.³⁰

The application of the framework to the realm of corruption eradication cannot be undertaken while ignoring the context of an already competitive system as described in the formulation of the first problem, but must be specifically designed to correct the context itself, not simply add a new layer on top of an unchanged context. The study on the implementation of the National Strategy for Corruption Prevention from the perspective of collaborative governance shows that collaborative governance in Indonesia is only seen in some preventive actions, while at the level of inquiry and investigation, coordination between institutions still faces structural obstacles in the form of insufficient legal harmonization and suboptimal inter-ministerial involvement.³¹

Interestingly, when explored further, Indonesia's legal framework proves never to have lacked norms to encourage coordination between law enforcement in the eradication of corruption. Article 50 of Law No. 30 of 2002 requires the Police or the Prosecutor's Office to notify the KPK no later within fourteen working days of commencing the investigation into a corruption case, and requires continuous coordination between the two institutions and the KPK throughout the investigation process.³² The study of the role of the three law enforcement agencies even concludes that stronger synergy is needed between the Police, the Prosecutor's Office, and the KPK for the eradication of corruption to run effectively, with strengthening coordination and supervision between agencies as a condition to overcome bureaucratic obstacles and political interference that have hindered its implementation.³³

The problem is that the coordination mechanism based on Article 50 is merely notificatory and administrative in nature, not a binding mutual agreement mechanism prior to the naming of suspects. The fourteen-working-day notification requirement only ensures that the KPK is aware of the ongoing investigation, but it does not provide a mandatory forum for coordinating steps when two institutions may be handling intersecting case objects. It is this vacuum that explains why the duplication of authority as outlined in the formulation of the first problem can still develop into open contestation, even though normatively the obligation of coordination has been regulated for a long time. From this point, *Collaborative Anti-Corruption*

³⁰ Kismartini et al., "Penta Helix Collaboration dalam Pemberantasan Korupsi untuk Mewujudkan Good Governance di Indonesia," *JIANA: Jurnal Ilmu Administrasi Negara* 10:2 (2022): 401 pada 401–415, DOI: 10.47828/jianaasian.v10i2.116.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Abd Majid Mahmud, "Penegakan Hukum Tindak Pidana Korupsi di Indonesia" (2025) [volume, nomor, dan halaman perlu dilengkapi].

³³ Ibid.

Governance needs to be formulated not as a new forum that adds to the list of existing coordination mechanisms, but as a correction to procedures that have been overlooked in the existing normative coordination design. The procedures required to realize Collaborative Anti-Corruption Governance are as follows:

First, with respect to initial conditions. Collaboration between institutions ties that have historically resembled formal hierarchies rather than relations between equals, so that trust between institutions is vulnerable to erosion when there is a conflict of authority in matters of public concern because each institution wants to look good in the eyes of the public. The absolute requirement for implementing Collaborative Anti-Corruption Governance is to close the gap between institutions as per the mechanism in Article 50 where the clarity of the limits of jurisdiction for corruption investigations outlined in binding norms must be enforced, so that it is not just an administrative notification obligation. The mechanism for taking over cases by the KPK as stipulated in Article 10A of Law No. 19 of 2019 needs to be clarified as an objective mechanism that applies automatically when two institutions handle the same object of the case, rather than a discretionary authority used only after the conflict has escalated into the public sphere.

Second, at the institutional level. The coordination and supervision function of the KPK based on Article 6 and Article 7 of Law No. 30 of 2002 and also strengthened by the obligation of the Police and the Prosecutor's Office to notify and coordinate continuously under Article 50, needs to be transformed from an administrative obligation to an operational and binding mechanism.³⁴ This institutional mechanism should require that any overlap in the handling of corruption cases must automatically be pursued through a joint case-title forum (*gelar perkara bersama*) of the three institutions whose decisions are final and binding, not just the obligation to report whose output depends on the administrative compliance of each institution. Although there is a mechanism related to the exemption of coordination obligations for investigators of the Prosecutor's Office and the KPK as stipulated in Article 7 paragraph (5) of the KUHAP, which was originally intended to respect the independence of the investigation of the two institutions, it needs to be balanced with a minimum coordination obligation in the form of a joint notification and a joint case title, so that the three institutions are aware of, and can directly observe, one another's processes so that the independence of the investigation does not turn into a gap for jurisdictional competition.

A joint case-title forum whose decision is final and binding cannot rest on practice alone, because it requires both a legal basis and a defined institutional design. The legal basis proposed here is an amendment to Article 50 of Law Number 30 of 2002, which at present imposes only a duty of notification, read together with Article 7 paragraphs (3) to (5) of Law Number 20 of 2025. The design should specify, at a minimum, the triggering condition, namely an intersection between two investigations in respect of the same person, the same transaction, or the same state loss. The participating officials and their required rank the decision rule and the quorum, the competence of the forum which extends to the allocation of the case and not

³⁴ Ibid.

to its merits safeguards against conflict of interest, including the recusal of an institution whose own officials are implicated the confidentiality regime and the obligation to keep a record the accountability of the decision through publication in summary form an objection mechanism available to the institution whose claim is rejected and the consequence of non-compliance, which should be the nullity of subsequent procedural acts taken in disregard of the allocation

Third, the model requires a facilitator, and the identity of that facilitator must be chosen with care. Assigning the President and the House of Representatives to mediate an active investigative conflict would place the political branches inside decisions on case allocation and suspect determination, which is difficult to reconcile with the independence of the Commission, the impartiality of prosecution, due process, and the presumption of innocence. The facilitating function is therefore located in this article in the coordination and supervision authority of the Commission under Article 6 letters b and d, Article 8, and Article 10 of Law Number 19 of 2019, as operationalised by Presidential Regulation Number 102 of 2020 and reinforced by the takeover mechanism in Article 10A. Where the Commission is itself a party to the intersecting case, the allocation should be referred to a legally insulated body constituted by statute, whose members are drawn from outside the leadership of the three institutions and whose decision is open to review. The President and the House of Representatives retain their constitutional roles in legislation, budgeting, and general oversight of the system, and it is through those roles, rather than through intervention at the level of individual cases, that the political branches contribute to the model.

Collaborative Supervision of Populist Programmes as a Distinct Preventive Layer Fourth, it is necessary to build a collaboration mechanism among state institutions beyond law enforcement agencies to supervise government programs from the planning, implementation, to evaluation stages. The eradication of corruption cannot rest solely on the Police, the Prosecutor's Office, and the KPK, because most government programs are actually carried out by ministries, institutions, local governments, service agencies, state-owned enterprises, and public service apparatus that is in direct contact with the community. Therefore, *Collaborative Anti-Corruption Governance* must be expanded into a cross-agency supervision mechanism that involves, among others, the BPK, BPKP, the Ombudsman of the Republic of Indonesia, PPATK, technical ministries, local governments, and public complaint channels that can be accessed by citizens. In this model, every public report on irregularities in government programs must not stop at an administrative complaint but must be promptly triaged to determine whether it contains elements of maladministration, governance irregularities, state financial losses, suspicious financial transactions, or indications of corruption. the public is positioned as a source of early detection, while state institutions carry out the functions of verification, audit, policy correction, and case forwarding in an integrated manner according to their respective authorities.

The mechanism that has been analyzed by the author above also answers the need for supervision of populist programs such as Free Nutritious Meals and Red and White Village Cooperatives, which are vulnerable to transforming into new corruption channels when cross-agency supervision only acts after cases have emerged. Through the fourth mechanism, supervision no longer only rests on law enforcement officials, but also on state institutions that have the functions of auditing, supervising public services, tracking financial transactions, internal government control, and managing public complaints. The study of the role of the KPK in the Free Nutritious Meal program shows a strategic shift from a repressive approach to strategic supervision from the planning stage, although this involvement still requires cross-sectoral strengthening given the large scale of the budget and the complexity of the program's distribution chain. Similar vulnerabilities were also identified in the Red and White Village Cooperative program, which was established solely on the basis of a Presidential Instruction, without a directly binding legal foundation, thus raising the risk of disharmony between central policy and village autonomy and institutional overlap with Village-Owned Enterprises that have been explicitly regulated in the law. With a Collaborative Anti-Corruption Governance that is binding from the initial-conditions variable through to the collaboration process, supervision of this kind of populist program can be shifted from the logic of reactive and competitive enforcement to cross-agency collaboration from the stages of budget planning, implementation of activities, citizen reporting, auditing, and policy evaluation, so that potential deviations in programs wrapped in welfare narratives can be prevented early before they develop into a contest over the naming of suspects.

The implementation of these four mechanisms must be seen as an immediate and urgent need, not a long-term institutional reform agenda that can be postponed, because the Free Nutritious Meal program and the Red and White Village Cooperative operate on a large budget scale, with an extensive implementing network and a very wide distribution of benefits, and are in direct contact with the community. The larger that scale, the greater the room for deviation across the planning, procurement, distribution, financing, and program accountability stages. The institution most competent to implement this mechanism immediately is the President as the holder of government power who can order coordination across ministries and institutions, together with the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia through legislation, budget, and supervision functions to ensure that the legal basis, budget allocation, and supervisory design run openly and bindingly. At the technical level, the President needs to assign the KPK as the coordinator for the integration of anti-corruption prevention and supervision, the BPK and BPKP as the supervisor of state financial audits and control, the Ombudsman of the Republic of Indonesia as the supervisor of public services and maladministration, the PPATK as a tracker of suspicious financial transactions, as well as technical ministries and local governments as implementers who are obliged to open program data and follow up on public reports. With immediate activation by these authorities, *Collaborative Anti-Corruption Governance* does not stop as an academic construction, but can be transformed into a rapid-response mechanism that ensures that every public report, audit findings, and indications of irregularities in populist programs

are immediately verified, corrected, and if necessary forwarded to law enforcement officials according to their respective authorities.

Based on the overall description above, it can be affirmed that *Collaborative Anti-Corruption Governance* is proposed as a means of restoring the institutional architecture of corruption eradication in Indonesia not by offering a completely new forum for collaboration, but by correcting the coordination mechanism that has been neglected so far. The correction includes four main mechanisms, namely the initial conditions built on the clarity of legally binding authority, the institutional design that transforms the notification obligation in Article 50 into a mandatory and final joint case title mechanism, the state leadership that is permanently institutionalized outside the structure of the three law enforcement institutions to mediate in conflicts of authority, as well as collaboration among state institutions beyond law enforcement that opens up space for supervision of government programs through audits, supervision of public services, transaction tracking, internal control, and public reporting. With the correction of these four mechanisms, the relationship between the Police, the Prosecutor's Office, and the KPK can be shifted from an ego-centric pattern that gives rise to contestation and *reciprocal criminalization* to a coherent pattern of joint orchestration, while opening up space for collaborative supervision of populist programs from the budget planning stage to implementation evaluation. Although the Free Nutritious Meal and the Red and White Village Cooperative can be read as the President's populist programs, which carry high political value since the election period, the President must still put the safety of the nation and state above sectoral and short-term political considerations. Therefore, the implementation of the collaborative mechanism must be interpreted as a constitutional and moral obligation to prevent the state from further falling into the expansion of corruption, not just as an instrument to secure the government's political image. Thus, *Collaborative Anti-Corruption Governance* is ultimately not just a theoretical offer, but an institutional reconstruction model that directly answers the impasse in handling corruption and an effort to safeguard the country against the growing corruption occurring in Indonesia.

IV. CONCLUSION

First, the allocation of investigative authority in corruption cases after Law Number 19 of 2019 is incomplete rather than absent. The Commission retains the tasks of coordination and supervision under Article 6 letters b and d, operationalised through Articles 8 and 10 and supported by Presidential Regulation Number 102 of 2020, while the Police, the Prosecutor's Office, and the Commission each hold lawful investigative authority under the Criminal Procedure Code and the sectoral laws. What no instrument supplies is an operative rule determining which institution proceeds when two lawful claims meet the same case object, since Article 50 of Law Number 30 of 2002 imposes only a duty of notification. Within that gap institutional ego-centrism becomes possible, and the two designations of July 2026 are read in this article as illustrations of that possibility rather than as proof of a causal relationship between the amendment and the conduct of the institutions concerned.

Second, Collaborative Anti-Corruption Governance is proposed as a means of closing that gap through four connected mechanisms, namely the clarification of jurisdictional boundaries as an initial condition, the conversion of the notification duty in Article 50 into a mandatory joint case-title forum with defined triggers and decision rules, the location of the facilitating function in the Commission's coordination and supervision authority rather than in the political branches, and the extension of collaboration to audit, public-service supervision, transaction tracking, internal control, and citizen reporting for the supervision of large-scale programmes. Realising the model requires an amendment to Law Number 30 of 2002 as amended, followed by adjustment of Presidential Regulation Number 102 of 2020 and of the internal regulations of each institution, and it cannot be achieved by circular or memorandum alone. The model is expected to narrow the space in which jurisdictional contestation arises, and its effectiveness requires testing against subsequent practice. This study is doctrinal, so its findings are confined to the normative plane, and claims about behavioural or institutional outcomes would require an empirical design that this article does not undertake.

REFERENCES

Book :

- Ahmad, Kamri. *Upaya Pemberantasan Korupsi*. 2nd ed. Makassar: Nas Media Pustaka, 2022.
- Allison, Graham T., and Philip Zelikow. *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. 2nd ed. New York: Routledge, 2021.
- Christensen, Tom, Per Lægreid, Paul G. Roness, and Kjell Arne Røvik. *Organization Theory and the Public Sector: Instrument, Culture and Myth*. 3rd ed. London: Routledge, 2022.
- Setiyawan, Wahyu Beny Mukti, et al. *Hukum Pidana Korupsi*. Serang: Sada Kurnia Pustaka, 2024.
- Sumaryanto, Djoko, Panji Susilo, and Budiono. *Buku Ajar Mata Kuliah Sistem Peradilan Pidana*. Surabaya: UBHARA Press, 2024.

Journal :

- Andriansyah, Fery, and Anom Wahyu Asmorojati. "The Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) in the Dynamics of Constitutional Legal Politics Following Law No. 19 of 2019." *Lex Renaissance* 10, no. 1 (2025): 249–65. <https://doi.org/10.20885/JLR.vol10.iss1.art10>.
- Ansell, Chris, and Alison Gash. "Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice." *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 18, no. 4 (2008): 543–71. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mum032>.
- Desianto, Ratman. "Sengketa Kewenangan Penyidikan Dalam Rangka Pemberantasan Korupsi." *Kertha Wicaksana* 16, no. 2 (2022): 123–39. <https://doi.org/10.22225/kw.16.2.2022.123-139>.

- Jawa, Dominikus, Parningotan Malau, and Ciptono. "Tantangan Dalam Penegakan Hukum Tindak Pidana Korupsi Di Indonesia." *Jurnal USM Law Review* 7, no. 2 (2024): 1006. <https://doi.org/10.26623/julr.v7i2.9507>.
- Mahendra, Hilmi, and Pramukhtiko Kencono. "Pengambilalihan Penyidikan Tindak Pidana Korupsi Berdasarkan Undang-Undang Nomor 19 Tahun 2019 tentang Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (Studi Kasus Tindak Pidana Korupsi oleh Lembaga Pembiayaan Ekspor Impor)." *Indonesian Journal of Law and Justice* 3, no. 1 (2025): 15. <https://doi.org/10.47134/ijlj.v3i1.4814>.
- Masyhudi, Fauzul. "Sinergisitas Peran Aparat Penegak Hukum Dalam Penanganan Korupsi di Indonesia." *Madania: Jurnal Hukum Pidana dan Ketatanegaraan Islam* 13, no. 1 (2023): 1. <https://journals.fasya.uinib.org/index.php/madania/article/view/500>.
- Mevelia, Veronika Christine, Devina Shava Amalia, and Tries Ellia Sandari. "Peran KPK dalam Memberantas Korupsi di Indonesia: Studi Kasus Dugaan Korupsi Program Makan Siang Gratis." *Rimba: Riset Ilmu Manajemen Bisnis dan Akuntansi* 3, no. 3 (2025): 90. <https://journal.arimbi.or.id/index.php/Rimba/article/view/1998>.
- Mochtar, Zainal Arifin. "Independensi Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi Pasca Undang-Undang Nomor 19 Tahun 2019." *Jurnal Konstitusi* 18, no. 2 (2021): 321. <https://doi.org/10.31078/jk1824>.
- Noor, Zulhadi Savitri. "Penguatan Koordinasi Penyidikan Tindak Pidana Korupsi Antar Lembaga Penegak Hukum Dalam Sistem Peradilan Pidana." *Syiar Hukum: Jurnal Ilmu Hukum* 19, no. 2 (2021): 213. <https://doi.org/10.29313/shjih.v19i2.8889>.
- Prakoesa, Petir Dahsyat Hadi, Dwi Wachidiyah Ningsih, and Suyanto. "Tumpang Tindih Kewenangan Penyidikan Korupsi: Dampak terhadap Kepastian Hukum dan Due Process of Law." *Judge: Jurnal Hukum* 6, no. 07 (2026): 1302. <https://doi.org/10.54209/judge.v6i07.1997>.
- Putri, Novi Enjelina, and Muhaimin. "Dekonstruksi Independensi KPK Pasca-Revisi UU No. 19 Tahun 2019: Analisis Politik Hukum dan Penanganan Korupsi Pejabat Eksekutif." *Jurnal Politik Pemerintahan Dharma Praja* 18, no. 2 (2025). <https://doi.org/10.33701/jppdp.v18i2.5708>.
- Salsabil, Hilda Halnum, Muflih Munazih, and Siti Kunarti. "Tinjauan Hukum Administrasi Negara Terhadap Pembentukan Koperasi Desa Merah Putih Melalui Instruksi Presiden." *USM Law Review* (2025). <https://journals.usm.ac.id/index.php/julr/article/view/12031>.

Wahib. "Memaknai Independensi KPK Pasca Perubahan Kedua Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 19 Tahun 2019 atas Undang-Undang Nomor 30 Tahun 2002 tentang Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi." *Rechtsregel: Jurnal Ilmu Hukum* 5, no. 1 (2022). <https://doi.org/10.32493/rjih.v5i1.23776>.

Wijayanti, Anis, and Azhar Kasim. "Implementasi Strategi Nasional Pencegahan Korupsi di Indonesia: Perspektif Collaborative Governance." *Integritas: Jurnal Antikorupsi* 7, no. 2 (2022): 291. <https://doi.org/10.32697/integritas.v7i2.858>.

Reports and Policy Documents :

Badan Pembinaan Hukum Nasional. *Politik Hukum Penyelidikan dan Penyidikan dalam Hukum Acara Pidana*. Jakarta: BPHN Kementerian Hukum dan HAM RI. https://bphn.go.id/data/documents/ae_hukum_acara_pidana_penyelidikan_dan_penyidikan.pdf.

Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia. *Naskah Akademik Rancangan Undang-Undang tentang Perubahan Kedua atas Undang-Undang Nomor 30 Tahun 2002 tentang Komisi Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi*. Jakarta: DPR RI, 2019.

Indikator Politik Indonesia. *Tingkat Kepercayaan Publik terhadap Lembaga Penegak Hukum dan Politik: Temuan Survei Nasional 30 Desember 2023–6 Januari 2024*. Jakarta: Indikator Politik Indonesia, 2024.

Indonesia Corruption Watch. *Laporan Tren Penindakan Korupsi 2024*. Jakarta: ICW, 2025.

Indonesia Corruption Watch. *Tren Penindakan Kasus Korupsi Tahun 2023*. Jakarta: ICW, 2024.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. *Public Integrity Outlook 2024*. Paris: OECD Publishing, 2024.

Pusat Studi Hukum dan Kebijakan Indonesia, and Indonesia Corruption Watch. *Laporan Evaluasi Kinerja Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi Periode 2019–2024*. Jakarta: PSHK & ICW, 2024.

Web Pages and Media :

- CNBC Indonesia. “Kejagung Tetapkan Polisi Tersangka Korupsi MBG, Ini Tanggapan Polri” (3 Juli 2026). Online: <<https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20260703110943-4-747778/kejagung-tetapkan-polisi-tersangka-korupsi-mbg-ini-tanggapan-polri>>.
- CNBC Indonesia. “Polisi Resmi Tetapkan Eks Jampidsus Febrie Adriansyah Jadi Tersangka” (11 Juli 2026). Online: <<https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20260711160506-4-750080/polisi-resmi-tetapkan-eks-jampidsus-febrie-adriansyah-jadi-tersangka>>.
- Hukumonline. “Tingkat Kepercayaan Publik terhadap Lembaga Hukum, Kejagung Tertinggi” (23 Januari 2024). Online: <<https://www.hukumonline.com/berita/a/tingkat-kepercayaan-publik-terhadap-lembaga-hukum--kejagung-tertinggi-lt65afca1bbb519>>.
- InfoPublik. “KPK Ingatkan Potensi Korupsi di Koperasi Desa Merah Putih, Dorong Transparansi sejak Awal” (2026). Online: <<https://infopublik.id/kategori/prioritas-nasional/920780/kpk-ingatkan-potensi-korupsi-di-koperasi-desa-merah-putih-dorong-transparansi-sejak-awal>>.
- Kompas. “Brigjen Polisi Aktif Jadi Tersangka Korupsi MBG, Polri: Tidak Ada Impunitas” (2 Juli 2026). Online: <<https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2026/07/02/15325581/brigjen-polisi-aktif-jadi-tersangka-korupsi-mbg-polri-tidak-ada-impunitas>>.
- Kumparan. “ICW Sebut Ada 791 Kasus Korupsi Sepanjang 2023, Tertinggi dalam 5 Tahun Terakhir” (19 Mei 2024). Online: <<https://kumparan.com/kumparannews/icw-sebut-ada-791-kasus-korupsi-sepanjang-2023-tertinggi-dalam-5-tahun-terakhir-22ln51wgp5J>>.
- Tempo. “Daftar Pasal Menjerat Eks Jampidsus Febrie Adriansyah” (2026). Online: <<https://metro.tempo.co/read/2114420/daftar-pasal-menjerat-eks-jampidsus-febrie-adriansyah>>.
- The Conversation. “Koperasi Merah Putih Berisiko Tinggi Jadi Ladang Korupsi Baru” (2026). Online: <<https://theconversation.com/koperasi-merah-putih-berisiko-tinggi-jadi-ladang-korupsi-baru-261401>>.
- Transparency International. Corruption Perceptions Index 2025. Berlin: Transparency International, 2026. Online: <<https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2025>>.

Laws and Regulations :

Undang-Undang Nomor 30 Tahun 2002 tentang Komisi Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi.

Undang-Undang Nomor 19 Tahun 2019 tentang Perubahan Kedua atas Undang-Undang Nomor 30 Tahun 2002 tentang Komisi Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi.

Undang-Undang Nomor 20 Tahun 2025 tentang Hukum Acara Pidana.

Undang-Undang Nomor 31 Tahun 1999 tentang Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Korupsi sebagaimana diubah dengan Undang-Undang Nomor 20 Tahun 2001.